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Abstract
In many developing and transition countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption.
This is surprising from a political economy perspective, as the majority of people in a corrupt
country su®er from high corruption levels. Our model is based on the fact that corrupt
o±cials have to pay entry fees to get lucrative positions. In a probabilistic voting model, we
show that a lack of ¯nancial institutions can lead to more corruption as more voters are part
of the corrupt system and, more importantly, as the rents from corruption are distributed
di®erently. Thus, the economic system has an e®ect on political outcomes. Well-functioning
¯nancial institutions, in turn, increase the political support for anti-corruption measures.
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In many developing and transition countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption. This
is surprising from a political economy perspective, since the majority of people in a corrupt
country should su®er from high corruption levels. Thus, citizens should have an interest in the
reduction of corruption. Why then does the political market seem not to solve this problem, i.e.
why do citizens not exert enough political pressure to reduce the corruption level?
In order to answer this question, we analyze the interaction between economic institutions
which shape political preferences and the political outcomes - in our case, the corruption level.
We take a closer look at the situation in developing and transition countries. Here, corruption
generally spreads over all levels of the bureaucracy. The lower-level o±cials dealing with ¯rms
and households demand bribes for providing particular services. The upper level bureaucrats
also pro¯t from corruption by demanding an entry fee for granting access to these lucrative
lower-level positions in the bureaucracy.1 The corrupt o±cials and their superiors are thus the
groups of citizens that bene¯t from corruption. However, their share of the population is too
small to explain the persistence of corruption.
We show that an explanation for high corruption levels can be found in the existence of
entry fees for lucrative positions and the way they are ¯nanced. Entry fees are often ¯nanced
by relatives and friends. Yet, in a developing economy, ¯nancial institutions gain increasing
in°uence. Banks provide both access to credit and investment opportunities, but they may
take di®erent approaches to corruption. Some banks subscribe to a code of ethics, committing
themselves to refusing all interactions that could be linked to corruption.2 Other banks, in
contrast, may even \dirty money", i.e., they take deposits and grant loans that are used to
¯nance bribes (see report on Russian banking in The Economist, 01/27/ - 02/02/2007, p. 68).
We thus have to explain: how does the emergence of ¯nancial intermediation change the support
for anti-corruption measures? And how does the attitude of banks toward ¯nancing entry fees
a®ect this outcome?
In our model, the corrupt o±cials must pay entry fees to their superiors. Since the entry
1For example, engineers of the water irrigation system in India pay entry fees of up to 14 times their annual
salary. See Wade (1982, p. 305) and the discussion in section 2.
2For example, twelve global banks form the Wolfsberg Group. Its members promote, in collaboration with
Transparency International, anti money-laundering principles and published statements on the ¯nancing of ter-
rorism and on monitoring, screening and searching (http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com).
1fees cannot be fully ¯nanced by the o±cials' wealth, they have to borrow part of the amount. If
¯nancial markets are absent, they may resort to their relatives or friends. As the relatives' return
depends on the corruption level, these ¯nancial transactions give them a stake in corruption.
Thus, in such a case, relatives do not have the incentive to support anti-corruption campaigns.
With ¯nancial markets, citizens may have access to loans and the relation between corrupt
o±cials and relatives may be softened, depending on the role banks choose to play in the
economy. When banks do not grant loans used to ¯nance an entry fee, the corrupt o±cials will
still borrow from their relatives.
However, compared to the case without ¯nancial institutions, all citizens now have the
opportunity to save at a bank. This new outside option reduces the net surplus from corruption
that is shared among corrupt o±cials and relatives. When banks do not di®erentiate credits
according to their purpose, corrupt o±cials, too, have access to bank loans. While the corrupt
o±cials would still prefer to borrow from their relatives in order to give them a vested interest
in corruption, they can no longer coordinate to do so. As a result, corruption is lower in the
presence of a functioning ¯nancial system. Interestingly, given that a banking system exists, the
fact that banks do not give loans for entry fees does not necessarily reduce the corruption level
compared to the case where banks ¯nance entry fees.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the causes of and the impact of economic institu-
tions on corruption.3 The predominant cause for corruption at lower levels of the bureaucracy is
seen in the principal-agent relationship between bureaucrats and their superiors.4 The di®erent
levels of the bureaucracy at which corruption occurs are mostly studied separately; only a few
papers focus on corruption in hierarchies. Hillman and Katz (1987) show that rent seeking
provokes contests for the positions that grant authority to appropriate the transfers made in
the initial rent-seeking contest. This creates further social costs. Bac (1996a, 1996b) argues
that if low-level bureaucrats are monitored, they may collude with their superior by paying him
ex ante or by transferring a portion of their revenues from corruption to him in order to avoid
punishment. In line with the models on corruption in hierarchies, we argue that administrative
3For literature surveys on corruption see, for example, Bardhan (1997), Jain (2001), and Aidt (2003).
4In this model, we do not discuss measures to reduce administrative corruption. Papers in this rich strand
of literature look at the design of the wage structure (see Fan, 2006, Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998 and 2000,
and Besley and McLaren, 1993) as well as of the penalties for corrupt behavior (La®ont and Guessan, 1999,
Mookherjee and Png, 1995, Rose-Ackerman, 1975)
2corruption spreads over several levels of the bureaucracy as corrupt o±cials have to pay an entry
fee.
Both economic and political institutions in°uence the scope of corruption. In their sem-
inar papers, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 2000) show that (legal)
institutions a®ect both the ¯nancing decisions of ¯rms and corporate governance. Economic in-
stitutions in°uence the rents from corruption and thereby determine the corruption level: Ades
and Di Tella (1999) show that high rents in an industry, due to a lack of competition or natural
resources, are connected to high corruption levels.
Foellmi and Oechslin (2007) draw the attention to the link between ¯nancial institutions and
corruption: they argue that with imperfect ¯nancial markets, ¯rms receive credit only if they
can o®er su±cient collateral. However, ¯rms have to pay bribes to start a business. This reduces
the available collateral and drives some ¯rms out of the credit market. Thus, they provide an
e±ciency argument why corruption distorts investment decisions. In contrast to our paper, they
focus on the consequences, not the causes, of corruption due to imperfect ¯nancial institutions.
Corruption can also lead to an ine±cient allocation of inputs because of coordination failures:
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) show that when more resources are allocated to rent-
seeking, returns to productive activities fall faster than returns to rent-seeking. Thus, the
opportunity costs of further rent-seeking are reduced, making it more attractive. In a di®erent
context, Acemoglu (1995) argues that rent-seeking exerts a negative externality on rewards to
talent, resulting in ine±cient allocations of talent to unproductive activities. In our model,
too, the persistence of corruption is the result of a coordination failure, caused by political
externalities. The agents' incentives to support anti-corruption measures are determined by
their investment opportunities which, in turn, depend on the existence of a functioning ¯nancial
system. In the absence of ¯nancial institutions, it is individually rational for citizens to invest
in activities linked to corruption and then support policies that protect these rents.
Concerning the impact of political institutions on corruption, the empirical evidence shows
that countries with a majoritarian electoral system and with a longer exposure to democracy are
less corrupt (Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi, 2003, Treisman, 2000). It is particularly interesting
to study the persistence of corruption in a democratic regime. There, opposition to a corrupt
system has the most in°uence. But also in democracies, self-interested politicians will only
have incentives to implement anti-corruption policies if there is widespread political support
3for such measures.5 Corruption has been the decisive issue in the national elections in many
developing countries (World Bank, 2000). Some recent examples are the Ukraine (2004), Kenya
(2003), or Pakistan (2002) (source: BBC). With our model, we argue that ¯nancial institutions
shape the policy preferences of the constituents by o®ering them a broader set of ¯nancing
opportunities. Through this channel, the political support for anti-corruption measures increases
with the e®ectiveness of ¯nancial institutions. Thus, in spirit our model is close to Ho® and
Stiglitz (2004) who model the endogenous development of market-supporting institutions in the
political process. However, we study the opposite direction of causality, namely how economic
institutions in°uence the political outcome.
The paper is organized as follows: Next, we study corruption and the market for lucrative
jobs in developing and transition countries. In section 3, we set up the model and discuss the
di®erences between the cases with and without a functioning ¯nancial sector. In section 4, we
study the e®ects of ¯nancial institutions on corruption. For this, we ¯rst develop a probabilistic
voting model on anti-corruption policies. We derive and then compare the equilibrium corruption
level for di®erent scenarios with and without ¯nancial institutions. Section 5 concludes.
2 Corruption, Financial Institutions, and Entry Fees
The empirical literature suggests that countries with better institutions are less corrupt (Abed
and Davoodi, 2002, Dreher et al., 2007). Yet it is very di±cult to distinguish causes and conse-
quences of corruption. When trying to explain the causes of corruption, a possible link between
¯nancial institutions and the incidence of corruption in a country is the mode of ¯nancing the
entry fee for lucrative positions in the bureaucracy. There is evidence from several developing
countries that bureaucrats who obtain a lucrative job have to pay entry fees. In turn, o±cials
have to be bribed for a variety of services. A World Bank survey (1998) conducted among 350
enterprises in Georgia indicates that most instances of corruption occur during tax and ¯nancial
inspections and at customs. According to this survey, 71% of the enterprises would be willing
to pay higher taxes if corruption were eliminated. Those enterprises that indicate their willing-
ness to pay higher taxes would pay additional taxes of up to 22% of their revenues in order to
eliminate corruption. These ¯gures indicate that the total amount of bribes paid by enterprises
5An empirical study on Uganda shows that providing the population with information and thus improving
their ability to monitor corrupt o±cials reduces embezzlement dramatically (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004).
4must be substantial.6
For the o±cials, the bribes translate into high rents from o±ce. Evidence from the Ukraine
suggests that bribery accounts for at least 20 per cent of the total wage compensation in the
public sector (Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova, 2007). The existence of entry fees for positions
in the bureaucracy is well known not only among the o±cials but also in the general public. The
entry fee increases with the amount of bribes that can be appropriated in a particular position.
In Georgia, the percentage of public o±cials believed to have purchased their position exceeds
50% for customs and tax inspectors. More than one third of the positions of natural resource
licensers, judges, investigators, and prosecutors are believed to have been purchased (World
Bank, 1998).7
The seminal article on the market for public o±ce is by Wade (1982). He collected evidence
for the \corruption system" found in the canal irrigation industry in India, which is still among
the most corrupt countries of the world (in 2006, India ranked 70th in the Transparency In-
ternational CPI ranking). Irrigators pay o±cials in order to ensure the water supply either for
the whole season or for emergencies. On average, an Assistant Engineer receives an additional
annual income from bribes of about 3.5 times his o±cial annual wage. Each year, an Exec-
utive Engineer earns about 9 times his o±cial annual salary from bribes. Senior o±cers and
politicians appropriate part of the engineers' additional income by demanding an entry fee for
assigning them to a particular position. The entry fee that an engineer has to pay depends on
the productivity of the area where his position is located. In the uplands, it costs an Executive
Engineer about three times his o±cial annual wage to get a position with a two-year tenure. In
contrast, on the fertile deltas, the entry fee can be up to about 14 times his annual salary.
In many developing countries, ¯rms resort to the informal credit market and ¯nance new
investments by borrowing from family and friends (Safavian, Fleisig, and Steinbuks, 2006). This
implies that access to bank loans is even more di±cult for individuals. Often their only source
of ¯nance is borrowing from relatives. As a result, corrupt o±cials may also borrow from their
6This is re°ected in Georgia's position in the Transparency International ranking of the CPI. It lists countries
according to their CPI scores where the country with the lowest perceived corruption level has the highest score. In
2006 (2002), Georgia was ranked 99 (85) of 163 (102), showing that the anti-corruption reform after the elections
in 2003 had a bite.
7Entry fees are widespread in the health sector as well. In Ghana about 25 per cent of jobs are bought in
government hospitals (Lewis, 2006). Similar ¯gures are provided for Uganda (Azfar, Kahkonen and Meagher,
2001)
5relatives (Togonidze, 2003).
We base our model on these observations, i.e., we take for granted that an entry fee for
lucrative positions has to be paid. We show that the entry fees may be the link between the
level of ¯nancial development and the corruption level in a country. Access to bank loans
determines the possibilities of ¯nancing the entry fee. Thus, the quality of the ¯nancial system
shapes the political preferences of di®erent groups of voters and a®ects the political support for
anti-corruption campaigns.
3 Financing the Entry Fee
For the basic setup of the model, we describe the economy, the ¯nancial institutions, and their
impact on the ¯nancing of the entry fees. We compare di®erent cases: ¯rst, we look at an
economic system without functioning ¯nancial institutions. Second, we introduce functioning
¯nancial institutions. In the second case, we focus on the role of banks. On the one hand, banks
take interest-bearing deposits. On the other hand, they grant loans. For the credit market, we
set up two di®erent scenarios, depending on whether banks ¯nance entry fees or not (which will
be called pooling and screening, respectively).
3.1 The Model
The economy with population size n consists of four groups of citizens: The depositors D, the
corrupt o±cials K, the relatives R of the corrupt o±cials, and the superiors S of the corrupt
o±cials. Each group has ®Jn identical individuals, where ®J, J = fD;K;R;Sg, denotes the
share of a particular group. Each citizen has the same initial endowment A; A > 0. There is no
depreciation.
All groups of citizens su®er equally from corruption. The disutility from corruption is given
by ¡u(c), where u(c) > 0. It does not only capture the costs of the bribe but also other negative
aspects of corruption such as time lags in getting services, the non-enforceability of services for
which bribes have been paid and the psychological costs involved. We assume that these costs
grow with the level of corruption c, such that
@u(c)
@c > 0 and
@2u(c)
(@c)2 > 0. Note that the corrupt
o±cials su®er under corruption like all the others, as they also need other services except for
the one which they themselves are providing.8
8Our results would be qualitatively una®ected by the alternative assumption that corrupt o±cials do not su®er
6Depositors. The depositors want to invest their endowment in order to earn returns on their
assets. They can do this only on the formal credit market. On the informal credit market,
there exist high transaction costs, which can only be overcome by family ties.9 However, the
depositors do not have relatives whom they could lend to.
Corrupt O±cials. All citizens have to pay a bribe if they use any of the public services
o®ered by the o±cials. Each corrupt o±cial can collect a bribe c, c ¸ 0, from everyone who
demands that certain public service that he is providing. This fraction of the population is
denoted by ¾ 2 [0;1]. We assume ¾ to be exogenously given. The total amount of bribes each
corrupt o±cial can collect thus amounts to ¾(n ¡ 1)c.
In order to focus on how the mode of ¯nancing the entry fee in°uences the political choice of
the corruption level c, we take the number of positions in the bureaucracy as given. The group
of citizens who have obtained these positions is called the group of corrupt o±cials K. Due to
the corruption rent, these positions are so attractive that the superiors can demand an entry
fee for each of them.10 The size of the entry fee T(c) > 0 depends on the amount of rents that
public servants can extract from the other citizens. We choose a linear speci¯cation, T(c) = tc,
with t > 0. In this paper, we do not endogenize the superiors' choice of the size of the entry
fee.11 We assume that the entry fee is set in such a way that the corrupt o±cials get at least
some positive payo® from corruption, i.e. that the surplus from corruption is positive.
We require that A < T · 2A. This implies that each corrupt o±cial has to borrow some
amount from his relative or ask for a loan at the bank in order to ¯nance the entry fee. Our
assumption ensures that one relative has enough funds to pay the whole missing amount for the
from corruption, i.e., u(c) = 0 for group K.
9In our model, transaction costs among relatives are set to zero. Yet, our results would be preserved as long
as transaction costs are low enough to allow interaction on the informal intra-family credit market.
10By demanding an entry fee, the superiors ensure that only persons with the appropriate skills and prefer-
ences apply for positions as public o±cials: Those who are non-corruptible or are unable to extract bribes from
their clientele will ¯nd the job in the bureaucracy unpro¯table (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). With this selection
mechanism, the bureaucracy is composed solely of corrupt o±cials. For the purpose of the model, the presence
of additional non-corrupt o±cials would not alter the results even though this group of voters would not have a
positive stake in corruption.
11In an earlier version of this paper, we endogenize the superiors' choice of the size of the entry fee. We show
that they actually have an incentive to leave a positive rent from corruption to the corrupt o±cials, if they are able
to coordinate in any way. The reason is that they want to reduce the corrupt o±cials' support for anti-corruption
policies. Therefore, we can exclude the case where competition for positions drives the entry fees up and the rents
of the corrupt o±cials down to zero.
7entry fee. We allow each corrupt o±cial to borrow from one relative only. If this informal credit
market is to be cleared, the group sizes of corrupt o±cials and relatives have to be equal, i.e.,
®K = ®R. For our model, this is the most restrictive case; the group of voters that potentially
have a positive stake in corruption is minimized. If each corrupt o±cial could borrow from
several relatives, more voters would receive a positive, albeit smaller, revenue from corruption.
The results of our analysis would qualitatively remain the same.12 Note that the superiors could
always get at least a payment of A from the corrupt o±cials. In this case, the corrupt o±cials
would not need external sources of ¯nancing. However, as the focus of this model is the e®ect
of the di®erent modes of ¯nancing the entry fee on the level of corruption, we exclude this case.
Relatives. Relatives di®er from the depositors in that they have a corrupt o±cial in their
close family. This is an advantage for them insofar as they have the opportunity to invest on
the informal credit market.
Superiors. The superiors collect the entry fees T(c) and put them into their private pockets.
As our focus does not lie on this group, we assume that they are of mass 0, i.e., ®S = 0. Note
further that the superiors cannot lend to the corrupt o±cials as the transaction costs on the
informal credit market can only be overcome by family ties. We assume that they spend their
revenues on consumption.
The time structure of the model is as follows: In period 1, the level of corruption c is
determined in the elections (for the time structure of the election subgame see section 4.1). In
period 2, the corrupt o±cials decide on the ¯nancing of the entry fee T(c). In period 3, the
corruption level is realized, the bribes are collected and individuals receive their payo®s. The
time structure is depicted in ¯gure 2. Since the game is solved by backward induction, we start
with the decision of how to ¯nance the entry fee.
Figure 2: Time Structure
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Election Decision on
¯nancing T
Corruption level and
payo®s realize
H H
t
© ©
12Only in the extreme case of perfect competition among the relatives would their rent from corruption be
reduced to zero.
83.2 The Economy without Financial Institutions
In this section, we study the case where no ¯nancial institutions exists.
Depositors. When there are no ¯nancial institutions, the depositors have no possibility to
invest their initial endowment. They do not have access to the informal credit market as they
are not relatives of a corrupt o±cial. Thus, the utility function of each depositor is composed of
his initial endowment and of his losses from corruption. His utility is given by UN
D (c) = A¡u(c),
where the superscripts N denote the utility levels in the case with no ¯nancial institutions.
Corrupt O±cials. The corrupt o±cials receive bribes of the amount of ¾(n¡1)c.13 In order
to get access to their jobs, the corrupt o±cials have to pay the entry fee T(c) = tc to their
superiors. To ¯nance this fee, the corrupt o±cials need some funds in addition to their initial
endowment A. The corrupt o±cials borrow the amount (tc ¡ A) from the relatives and repay
(1 + bN)(tc ¡ A). The term bN is equivalent to the interest rate on the informal credit market
and is determined in a Nash bargaining game among the pairs of corrupt o±cials and relatives.
We assume equal bargaining power of corrupt o±cials and relatives. The utility of the corrupt
o±cials when there are no ¯nancial institutions is:
UN
K(c) = ¾(n ¡ 1)c ¡ (1 + bN)(tc ¡ A) ¡ u(c) (1)
Relatives. The relatives receive the interest rate bN on the amount of capital which they
lend to their corrupt family members. Their utility is thus:
UN
R (c) = A + bN(tc ¡ A) ¡ u(c) (2)
When bargaining over bN, the corrupt o±cial and the relative have the same disagreement
payo® A ¡ u(c). If negotiations break down, the relative has no possibility to invest his endow-
ment. Neither does the corrupt o±cial have the possibility to obtain the job. As a result, both
parties become depositors. We can state the following result for the bargaining game in the case
without ¯nancial institutions:
13Note that certain restrictions have to be imposed on ¾ to ensure that the revenues from corruption equal the
sum of bribes paid in the economy. The revenues from corruption depend on ¾, i.e., on how many individuals
use each particular service. The sum of bribes paid, in turn, depends on how many services each individual uses.
Assume each citizen uses Á services. The total revenues from corruption are ¾(n ¡ 1)c®Kn. These have to equal
the sum of bribes paid by all citizens, i.e., cnÁ. Thus, we need ¾ =
Á
(n¡1)®K . This model uses the disutility
function ¡u(c) to capture the costs from corruption for each individual. Here, Á is implicitly included.
9Proposition 1 Without functioning ¯nancial institutions, the relatives lend to the corrupt of-
¯cials on the informal credit market and receive the interest rate bN on their loan, where
bN =
[¾(n ¡ 1) ¡ t]c
2(tc ¡ A)
: (3)
Proof. In the Nash bargaining solution with symmetric bargaining power, bN maximizes
the surplus that is then split evenly among the two parties. Formally, the solution is given by:
bN = argmax
h³
UN
K (c) ¡ UN
D (c)
´³
UN
R (c) ¡ UN
D (c)
´i
This yields the following ¯rst-order condition:
@UN
R
@bN
³
UN
K (c) ¡ UN
D (c)
´
+
@UN
K
@bN
³
UN
R (c) ¡ UN
D (c)
´
= 0
Inserting the utility functions and simplifying, we get:
¾(n ¡ 1)c ¡ (1 + bN)(tc ¡ A) ¡ u(c) = A + bN(tc ¡ A) ¡ u(c)
Solving for bN, this yields bN =
[¾(n¡1)¡t]c
2(tc¡A) .
In the case without functioning ¯nancial institutions, corrupt o±cials and relatives have the
same disagreement payo® and share the net surplus from corruption equally. Their utility levels
after the bargaining are thus equal:
UN
K (c) = UN
R (c) =
1
2
[¾(n ¡ 1) ¡ t]c + A ¡ u(c) (4)
As discussed above, there must be a net surplus of corruption that can be split in the
bargaining game. The surplus from corruption is given by [¾(n ¡ 1) ¡ t]c. Each party gets
its disagreement payo® and a positive revenue on top of that. Otherwise, the positions in the
bureaucracy would cease to be attractive.
3.3 The Economy with Financial Institutions
Next, we introduce ¯nancial institutions in the economy. To keep the analysis of the ¯nancial
sector tractable, we study a small open economy. Therefore, the interest rate r is determined
by the world market and is identical for deposits and loans. In the following, we distinguish
two di®erent scenarios for the credit market. In the ¯rst case, banks are able to screen the
borrowers. This allows them to deny credit to any borrower who intends to ¯nance an entry fee
for a position in the bureaucracy. In the second case, banks do not di®erentiate loans according
10to their purpose and o®er a pooling contract to all applicants, including corrupt o±cials, at
the rate r.14 We do not distinguish whether banks are not able to detect corrupt borrowers
or have no interest to do so, for example, because ¯nancing corruption is an activity with a
comparably high payo® in a given country. For notational clarity, we denote utilities with the
superscript S or P when the citizens use the formal credit market and banks o®er screening or
pooling contracts, respectively. When citizens decide to use the informal credit market although
a banking sector is present and functioning, we use the superscripts IS or IP.
Depositors. The depositors can save their endowment on the formal credit market. They
still su®er under corruption. Their utility with a functioning ¯nancial system is:
US
D (c) = UP
D (c) = (1 + r)A ¡ u(c) (5)
3.3.1 Screening
We start with the scenario in which banks screen all applicants and grant credit only to borrowers
who do not ¯nance entry fees. Therefore, we assume that banks receive perfect signals about
their creditors without incurring any costs. As a result, they o®er credit only to non-corrupt
investors at the world market interest rate r. In practice, the screening process could, for
example, involve that banks demand a business plan from potential borrowers in order to evaluate
their investment projects. Corrupt o±cials have no possibility to get credit as they are unable
to provide a business plan.
Corrupt O±cials. If the corrupt o±cials do not borrow from their relatives, they are not
able to pay the entry fee and remain depositors. Consequently, their outside option amounts
to US
K (c) = (1 + r)A ¡ u(c). For the corrupt o±cials, the only way to ¯nance the entry fee is
still to borrow from their relatives. In this case, we denote the bargaining outcome by bS. The
relatives, just like the corrupt o±cials, now have the outside option to save at the bank at the
rate r. The utility of the corrupt o±cials when they borrow from their relatives is:
UIS
K (c) = ¾ (n ¡ 1)c ¡
³
1 + bS
´
(tc ¡ A) ¡ u(c) (6)
Relatives. The relatives have the choice to save at the bank or to lend to the corrupt
o±cials. If the relatives save their whole initial endowment at the bank, their utility is US
R (c) =
14In our model, banks act only in the economic sphere and do not have any direct political in°uence. Moreover,
there is no reason why banks in this model should have any pronounced political interest, as by assumption, they
make zero pro¯ts for all corruption levels.
11(1 + r)A ¡ u(c). If they decide to lend to the corrupt o±cials, they earn the rate bS on the
amount that they lend. For the rest of their endowment, i.e., 2A ¡ tc, they receive the rate r
from the bank. Their utility is:
UIS
R (c) = A + bS (tc ¡ A) + r(2A ¡ tc) ¡ u(c) (7)
In the case with screening, we can state the following result for the bargaining game:
Proposition 2 If banks screen, the relatives lend to the corrupt o±cials on the informal credit
market and receive the interest rate bS on their loan, where
bS =
(n ¡ 1)¾c ¡ tc(1 ¡ r) ¡ 2rA
2(tc ¡ A)
: (8)
Proof. See the Appendix.
After the bargaining, the utility functions in the situation where banks screen are identical
for corrupt o±cials and relatives:
US
K (c) = US
R (c) =
1
2
[¾ (n ¡ 1) ¡ (1 + r)t]c + (1 + r)A ¡ u(c) (9)
In the case with screening, the surplus from corruption is given by [¾(n¡1)¡(1+r)t]c. As
the surplus from corruption must be positive, we get as a result that bS > r.
How does a functioning ¯nancial sector alter the result of the bargaining game? Given our
assumption tc < 2A, we can show that the equivalent of the interest rate on the informal credit
market decreases with respect to the case without banks, i.e., bS < bN:
(n ¡ 1)¾c ¡ tc(1 ¡ r) ¡ 2rA < [¾(n ¡ 1) ¡ t]c , r(tc ¡ 2A) < 0 (10)
Here, we can see two e®ects: First, the existence of a functioning banking sector when
banks screen reduces the net surplus from corruption by (1+ r)tc as both relatives and corrupt
o±cials have the outside option to save at the bank. Second, the interest rate on the informal
credit market decreases. The relatives now have an additional opportunity to save whatever
they do not lend to the corrupt o±cials, i.e., 2A ¡ tc, at the bank at the rate r. In symmetric
Nash bargaining, the relatives have to compensate the corrupt o±cials for their additional gain
of r(2A ¡ tc) from saving at the bank. Thus, the existence of ¯nancial institutions not only
in°uences the surplus generated by corruption but also its distribution.
123.3.2 Pooling
If ¯nancial institutions exist, both corrupt o±cials and relatives can save at the bank - indepen-
dent of the type of loan contract o®ered by the bank. In our scenario with pooling, banks serve
all applicants for loans and make o®ers at the rate r. In reality, banks may o®er consumer loans
based on credit scoring models where the corrupt o±cial can easily disguise the use of the loan
or banks may even be interested in ¯nancing corruption, e.g. due to a lack of other pro¯table
investment opportunities in a country.
Corrupt O±cials. Now, the corrupt o±cials can borrow the amount tc ¡ A > 0 from the
bank. They have to pay the interest rate r on their loan. The utility of the corrupt o±cials
when they borrow on the formal credit market is:
UP
K (c) = ¾(n ¡ 1)c ¡ (1 + r)(tc ¡ A) ¡ u(c) (11)
When they use the informal credit market, the outside option to borrow from the bank
a®ects the disagreement utilities of the corrupt o±cials. We denote the bargaining outcome in
presence of a bank that o®ers a pooling contract with bP. The utility of the corrupt o±cials if
they borrow from their relatives is:
UIP
K (c) = ¾(n ¡ 1)c ¡ (1 + bP)(tc ¡ A) ¡ u(c) (12)
Relatives. The relatives can save at the bank or lend to the corrupt o±cials. When the
relatives invest only in the formal credit market, they get UP
R(c) = (1 + r)A ¡ u(c). When the
relatives decide to stay in the informal credit market, they receive the rate bP for the amount
(tc ¡ A) that they lend to the corrupt o±cials. They can save the rest of their endowment,
2A ¡ tc, at the bank at the rate r. When the relatives decide to stay in the informal credit
market and lend to the corrupt o±cials, their utility is given by:
UIP
R (c) = A + bP(tc ¡ A) + r(2A ¡ tc) ¡ u(c) (13)
In the bargaining game, the disagreement payo®s of both corrupt o±cials and relatives are
given by UP
K (c) and UP
R (c). Since the disagreement payo®s di®er for the two parties, their
incentives to make concessions in the bargaining game change, too. In the case where banks
o®er pooling contracts, we can state the following result:
Proposition 3 If banks o®er pooling contracts, the Nash bargaining solution yields bP = r.
13Proof. See the Appendix.
The surplus from corruption is the same as in the case of screening, but it is divided dif-
ferently. When bargaining on the informal credit market, both groups receive exactly the same
utility level as when they save at or borrow from the bank. The only interest rate in this econ-
omy is the world market rate r. The corrupt o±cials have the outside option to take a bank
loan to ¯nance the entry fee. Individually, each corrupt o±cial is indi®erent between borrowing
from his relative or from the bank. Bargaining does not create any additional surplus. We will
discuss the e®ects of this on the political equilibrium in section 4. Note that it is irrelevant
whether or not the corrupt o±cials actually use the bank. The relatives always get the same
utility level. Thus, their interest in the level of corruption is identical to that of the depositors.
Both groups only experience costs from corruption.
4 Financial Institutions and Anti-Corruption Policies
We are interested in how the di®erent modes of ¯nancing the entry fee a®ect the corruption level
in our economy. The political market creates the connection between ¯nancial institutions and
the corruption level: voters' preferences for a higher or lower corruption level are shaped by the
distribution of rents from corruption which is in turn in°uenced by the means of ¯nancing of the
entry fee. When voters prefer low corruption levels, they will demand anti-corruption policies
and politicians will run on anti-corruption platforms.
In this section, we ¯rst set out our probabilistic voting model of political decision-making.
Then, we derive the political equilibrium and compare the equilibrium corruption levels in
di®erent scenarios with and without ¯nancial institutions.
4.1 Voting on Anti-Corruption Policies
In this section, we describe how the level of corruption is determined in the political process. We
use a probabilistic voting model. There are two candidates, X and Y; running for election. The
policy platform on which the candidates run for o±ce is the corruption level in the economy. Each
of the two candidates strives to get the majority of votes in the population.15 The candidate who
15Similarly, we could assume that the candidates maximize their probabilities of winning the elections, that is,
the probabilities of getting the majority of votes. As shown in Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), under fairly general
conditions, the maximization problem for the candidates is then similar to the problem of maximizing the vote
shares. These conditions are ful¯lled by the assumptions in this model.
14wins the majority of votes implements his proposed policy. We abstract from possible di±culties
and costs of implementing the politically desired corruption level.16 Moreover, we assume, as
is standard in this literature, that politicians are able to commit perfectly to their announced
policy platforms. A probabilistic voting approach allows us to capture the uncertainty present
in real-world elections. Politicians do not have perfect information about the preferences of
individual voters. In the model, the politicians design their policy platforms on the basis of
their expectations about the political responsiveness of the di®erent groups of the electorate.
In addition, the model has the advantage of incorporating the voters' political responsiveness
to marginal policy changes. In contrast to a median voter model, it does not only consider the
individual votes but also takes into account how much this policy matters for the di®erent groups
of voters. The politicians cater most to those groups of the electorate whom they perceive to
be most responsive to a change in their policy platforms, i.e., the corruption level. Thus, the
model does not preclude high corruption levels even when the majority of voters su®ers from
corruption.
As we assume that the superiors are a very small group, i.e., ®S = 0, they do not have
any political in°uence. Thus, we have to consider three groups of voters: depositors, corrupt
o±cials and relatives. Each group of voters is a fraction ®J of the total population with J =
fD;K;Rg and
P
J ®J = 1.17 Individuals base their voting decision on two elements: ¯rst,
they consider their utility from the candidates' announced platform, in particular the corruption
policy UJ(c). Second, their voting decision is also in°uenced by their ideology or ¯xed preferences
for other policy issues, which candidates do not include in their policy platform. In group J,
voter i's ideological preference for candidate Y is given by the individual-speci¯c parameter
siJ. The individual ideology parameters are uniformly distributed in each group according to
siJ » [¡ 1
2SJ ; 1
2SJ ]. Generally, the more siJ di®ers from 0; the stronger the ideology component
in the citizen's voting decision is. A citizen with a strong ideological bias is less responsive to
changes in the policy platforms cX and cY announced by the candidates.
The time structure for the elections is as follows: in the ¯rst time period, the two candidates
16Introducing costs of reducing corruption for the politicians would preserve our results as long as these costs
are similar in all our scenarios.
17We do not consider that the superiors might be able to exert pressure on political decision makers in favor
of corruption. It can be shown that all results of this paper still hold when the superiors are an active political
group.
15announce their policy platforms cX and cY . The candidates know the voters' policy preferences
UJ(c) and the distributions for siJ: They do not know the realizations of siJ. After announcing
the policy platforms, candidates observe the realizations of siJ. In the following time period,
elections are held. The candidate with the majority of votes wins the elections. He implements
the policy platform that he has announced.
Taking into account all the components which in°uence the election decision of voter i in
group J, voter i prefers candidate X if and only if UJ(cX) > UJ(cY ) + siJ. Candidates are
interested in identifying how easily voters of a group will switch to vote for them in response
to a marginal policy change. For each group, the \swing voter", i.e., the voter who is exactly
indi®erent between voting for candidate X or Y , is identi¯ed by the condition:
sJ = UJ(cX) ¡ UJ(cY ) (14)
Integrating over the ideological biases within groups and summing over all groups gives us
the vote share for candidate X as a function of the policy platforms cX and cY :18
vX =
X
J
®JSJ
µ
sJ +
1
2SJ
¶
=
X
J
®JSJ
µ
UJ(cX) ¡ UJ(cY ) +
1
2SJ
¶
(15)
Each candidate chooses his policy platform c in order to maximize his vote share v. We can
state the following general result.
Proposition 4 For each parameter constellation, both candidates choose the same uniquely
de¯ned policy platform c¤. It is determined by the condition
@v
@c
= 0 ()
X
J
®JSJ
@UJ(c)
@c
= 0: (16)
Proof. For each parameter constellation, we have a unique equilibrium if the vote shares of
candidates X and Y are strictly concave functions of the policy platforms cX and cY (see e.g.
Coughlin and Nitzan, 1981). In our setup, this is straightforward as the utility functions of all
groups are linearly additive and comprised of terms which are linear in c, and the disutility from
corruption ¡u(c) where ¡
@2u(c)
(@c) (c) < 0. Therefore, @2v
(@c)2 < 0.
In order to derive the equilibrium corruption levels, we insert the utility functions of all
groups. We do this in section 4.2. and 4.3. We then compare the equilibrium corruption levels
in order to derive conditions under which functioning ¯nancial institutions reduce corruption.
18For candidate Y , the vote share is derived similarly by integrating over all voters with a siJ higher than sJ
and summing over all groups: vY =
P
J ®JSJ
¡
1
2SJ ¡ sJ
¢
=
P
J ®JSJ
¡
UJ(cY ) ¡ UJ(cX) +
1
2SJ
¢
.
164.2 Corruption Level without Financial Institutions
The following lemma describes the policy choice without ¯nancial institutions:
Lemma 1 If no banks exist, the candidates propose a policy platform that determines an equi-
librium corruption level c¤
N, implicitly de¯ned by
@u(c¤
N)
@c
=
(®RSR + ®KSK)
h
¾(n¡1)¡t
2
i
P
J ®JSJ
(17)
with J 2 fD;K;Rg:
On the left hand side of equation (17), we see the marginal disutility from corruption. It
is identical for all groups. In the denominator of the right hand side, we ¯nd the groups that
su®er under corruption. As all citizens su®er equally under corruption, this is the sum over all
groups, weighted with the political responsiveness of the group SJ and the group's size ®J. The
components of the marginal utility in the numerator of the right hand side stem from those
groups that have a positive interest in corruption: the relatives, whose earnings on the informal
credit market depend positively on the corruption level, and the corrupt o±cials, who get a
positive surplus from collecting bribes in their position. Comparative statics show that the
equilibrium corruption level decreases as the entry fee increases. The more the corrupt o±cials
have to pay for their jobs, the lower the net surplus of corruption is. Then, the relatives and the
corrupt o±cials have a lower marginal bene¯t from an increasing corruption level and are more
supportive of anti-corruption policies. Note that the depositors show up only in the denominator
as they do not have any positive revenue from corruption.
4.3 Corruption Level with Financial Institutions
Next, we derive the equilibrium corruption levels with functioning ¯nancial institutions.
4.3.1 Screening
The following lemma describes the policy choice if banks screen their borrowers:
Lemma 2 If banks screen, the candidates propose a policy platform that determines an equilib-
rium corruption level c¤
S, implicitly de¯ned by
@u(c¤
S)
@c
=
(®RSR + ®KSK)
h
¾(n¡1)¡(1+r)t
2
i
P
J ®JSJ
: (18)
17Proof. See the Appendix.
As before, corrupt o±cials and relatives use the informal credit market. Also, relatives save
the part of their endowment that they do not lend to corrupt o±cials at the bank. Thus, the
relatives have a positive stake in corruption because they lend to the corrupt o±cials on the
informal credit market where they earn bS > r. However, relatives face a coordination problem.
If they could coordinate on saving at the bank, this would reduce the political support for
corruption and would lead to a lower equilibrium corruption level. Individually, however, it is
optimal for each relative to lend to a corrupt o±cial at the rate bS > r. If all other relatives
also lend to corrupt o±cials, the corruption level is high anyway. Similarly, the corruption level
remains low if all other relatives save at the bank, even if a single relative lends to a corrupt
o±cial. As the e®ect of a single voter on the election outcome is negligible, the individual
decision to stay in the informal credit market does not alter the equilibrium corruption level.
4.3.2 Pooling
The following lemma describes the policy choice if banks o®er loans to all citizens irrespective
of the purpose of the loan:
Lemma 3 If banks o®er pooling contracts, the candidates propose a policy platform that deter-
mines an equilibrium corruption level c¤
P, implicitly de¯ned by
@u(c¤
P)
@c
=
®KSK [¾ (n ¡ 1) ¡ (1 + r)t]
P
J ®JSJ
: (19)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Now, only the corrupt o±cials get a positive rent from corruption. Note again that for this
result, it is irrelevant whether the corrupt o±cials use the bank or not. The relatives do not
have a positive stake in corruption anymore. They receive the interest rate r on their total
asset endowment independent of whether they invest on the formal or informal credit market.
Therefore, they are missing from the numerator of the expression.
The corrupt o±cials are in a prisoners' dilemma-like situation. In the aggregate, they would
prefer to use the informal credit market and borrow from their relatives while giving them a
higher interest rate than the bank. They would then have allies in the elections: if relatives had
a stake in corruption, they would vote against possible anti-corruption measures. Individually,
however, the strategy to win over a relative by o®ering him a rate bP > r is not optimal for
a corrupt o±cial: Suppose that all corrupt o±cials borrow from the bank. O±cial k has no
18incentive to switch to the informal credit market and o®er a rate higher than r to his relative.
The relative would agree to lend to the corrupt o±cial when o®ered a higher rate than from the
bank. Yet, the corrupt o±cial would only win over one voter to the pro-corruption side. This
one vote does not change the corruption level chosen by the politician. Next, suppose that all
other corrupt o±cials borrow from their relatives at a rate bP > r. Then, it pays for o±cial
k to switch to the formal credit market because he can then borrow at a lower rate. As all
others stay in the informal credit market, the corruption level does not decrease. Thus, each
corrupt o±cial individually has the incentive to switch to the formal credit market or to lower
the rate he o®ers to the relative to bP = r. In this case, the relatives do not get any additional
surplus from lending in the informal credit market. This means that the corrupt o±cials cannot
coordinate to give the relatives a stake in corruption and remain the only group of voters with
a positive interest in corruption.
4.4 The Impact of Introducing Financial Institutions on the Corruption Level
To evaluate the e®ect of ¯nancial institutions on corruption, we compare the corruption levels
for the cases with and without banks.
Proposition 5 If banks screen, the corruption level with functioning ¯nancial institutions is
always lower than the corruption level without ¯nancial institutions,i.e., c¤
N > c¤
S.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the case without banks as well as in the case with banks that screen, the entry fee is
¯nanced via the informal credit market. Corrupt o±cials and relatives share the revenues from
corruption in both cases. How does the existence of a functioning banking sector then decrease
the equilibrium corruption level? When there are banks, corrupt o±cials and relatives have the
option to save at the bank. Thus, the relatives incur some opportunity costs if they decide to
lend to the corrupt o±cials. When sharing the surplus from corruption, the corrupt o±cials and
the relatives take these opportunity costs into account. Moreover, both groups now have better
outside options as they can earn the interest rate r on their endowment when they become
depositors. For both groups, this decreases the marginal net bene¯t from corruption. In the
situation with banks and screening, both groups are less responsive to a change in the corruption
level than in the situation without banks. As a consequence, the politicians cater less to these
groups. The equilibrium corruption level is reduced.
19In general, the existence of depositors decreases the level of corruption. Since they su®er
under corruption, they support anti-corruption policies. As they only su®er under corruption,
their utilities enter the ¯rst order condition for the optimal policy choice exactly in the same way
in the cases with and without ¯nancial institutions. Hence, for the comparison of one situation
to the other they do not play a role, regardless of their share in the population ®D or their
political responsiveness SD.
What happens if banks o®er pooling contracts and therefore the corrupt o±cials have access
to the formal credit market?
Proposition 6 If banks o®er a pooling contract, the corruption level with functioning ¯nancial
institutions is lower than the corruption level without these institutions, i.e., c¤
P < c¤
N, if and
only if
SK
·
¾ (n ¡ 1) ¡ t
2
¡ rt
¸
< SR
·
¾ (n ¡ 1) ¡ t
2
¸
: (20)
Proof. See the Appendix.
All costs and bene¯ts from corruption are weighted with the political importance of the
groups of voters, that is, the group size ®J and the group's political responsiveness SJ. This
was demonstrated in lemmas 1 - 3. The higher SJ, the more swing voters a group has and
the more politicians cater to this group. Due to our assumption that ®K = ®R, the group
sizes cancel out in condition (20). Compare the terms in square brackets, i.e., the changes
in marginal net bene¯ts from corruption when the economy switches from a situation without
¯nancial institutions to a situation where banks o®er pooling contracts. The left hand side of
condition (20) shows the resulting change of marginal net bene¯ts for the corrupt o±cials. If
banks exists, all revenues from corruption are reaped by the corrupt o±cials: As they ¯nance
the entry fee by taking a bank loan, they do not have to share the revenues from corruption.
Comparing the marginal utility to the case without ¯nancial institutions, they therefore receive
an additional half of the surplus from corruption,
¾(n¡1)¡t
2 . Yet, they have to bear the marginal
cost rt of ¯nancing the entry fee through a bank loan. The expression on the right hand side
shows that in the presence of banks, the relatives lose their half of the marginal net return on
corruption, i.e.
¾(n¡1)¡t
2 . It is obvious that with banks, the relatives' marginal utility from
corruption decreases more than the corrupt o±cials' marginal utility increases.
Consider ¯rst the case where both groups have the same responsiveness to a marginal policy
change, that is SK = SR. It is then clear that ¯nancial institutions lead to a lower equilibrium
20corruption level. In the presence of banks that o®er pooling contracts, the relatives lose all
their gains from corruption, and they become strict supporters of anti-corruption policies. The
corrupt o±cials marginally gain less from a ¯nancial system than the relatives lose. If both
groups have equal political power, this results in a lower corruption level. This e®ect is reinforced
for SK < SR.19
Now consider SK > SR. We can rewrite condition (20) as SR > SK
³
1 ¡ 2rt
¾(n¡1)¡t
´
. We
know from the corrupt o±cials' participation constraint that ¾ (n ¡ 1) ¡ t > 0. Therefore,
1 ¡ 2rt
¾(n¡1)¡t · 1. For t <
¾(n¡1)
1+2r , the expression
³
1 ¡ 2rt
¾(n¡1)¡t
´
is positive. Then, the entry fee
is low enough to give the corrupt o±cials a signi¯cant rent. This also implies that the marginal
revenue of the relatives is limited as the amount of the loans to the corrupt o±cial is low. Only
then - and if corrupt o±cials are more responsive to announced changes in the corruption level
than relatives - could ¯nancial institutions exacerbate the situation and increase the equilibrium
corruption level. For t >
¾(n¡1)
1+2r , which implies (1¡ 2rt
¾(n¡1)¡t) < 0, a banking sector which o®ers
pooling contracts always decreases the equilibrium corruption level, irrespective of the relative
political in°uence of the groups of voters.
Our analysis shows that a ¯nancial sector where banks screen unambiguously reduces the
equilibrium corruption level. If banks o®er pooling contracts, whether the corruption level in the
economy is reduced or not depends on the political power of the di®erent groups of voters: In
most cases, the presence of functioning ¯nancial institutions decreases corruption. Banks that
do not screen and o®er credit irrespective of the purpose of the loan reduce the political support
for anti-corruption policies only if the political in°uence of the corrupt o±cials compared to that
of the relatives is very high, and the entry fee is low.
4.5 Comparing Corruption Levels under Di®erent Financial Institutions
Does a banking sector reduce corruption more when a screening contract is o®ered or when a
pooling contract is o®ered? The di®erence between a banking sector with screening and with
pooling is the degree of information produced and used by the banks. In the case of pooling,
19In this case, the relatives are more responsive to marginal changes in the policy variable than the corrupt
o±cials. The political responsiveness, or the importance that voters attach to anti-corruption policies, can be
increased when the issue receives a lot of public attention, for example, when the news media publishes investi-
gations on corrupt government o±cials. Brunetti and Weder (2003) empirically show that an independent press
signi¯cantly decreases corruption levels. The reason they give is that corrupt behavior by government o±cials is
more likely to be discovered and criticized by a free press.
21banks either do not have access to information about the purpose of the loans or have no interest
in acquiring such information. Do banks that commit against ¯nancing corruption and screen
their applicants always lead to lower corruption levels? We can state
Proposition 7 The corruption level with functioning ¯nancial institutions is higher when banks
o®er a screening contract than when banks o®er a pooling contract, i.e., c¤
S > c¤
P, if and only if
SR > SK.
Proof. See the Appendix.
At ¯rst sight, this result is surprising because we would expect that if banks possess more
information and commit against ¯nancing corruption, the corruption level is always reduced
more strongly. However, we ¯nd that if the political weight of the corrupt o±cials is lower than
that of the relatives, a banking sector with screening is less e®ective in reducing corruption. The
reason is that with screening, both corrupt o±cials and relatives bene¯t from the corruption
revenues whereas with pooling, the corrupt o±cials reap all the bene¯ts. A banking system
that generates more information through screening induces individuals to resort to the informal
capital market and helps the corrupt o±cials to overcome their coordination problem to use the
informal credit market in order to give their relatives a stake in corruption. Then the gain in
marginal utility from the informal capital market that accrues to the relatives is equal to the
reduction in marginal utility the corrupt o±cials face as they have to share the revenue from
bribes with the relatives. Thus, if the relatives have a larger political weight, the corruption
level is higher in the case of screening.
5 Conclusion
The literature has studied corruption on the low levels of the administration and on the high lev-
els of government separately. However, both types of corruption are linked by corruption on the
intermediate levels of the bureaucracy. There, corruption takes the form of superiors demanding
entry fees in exchange for positions on lower levels of the hierarchy. We have shown that this
link between corruption on di®erent levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy and the necessity to
externally ¯nance part of the entry fee results in high corruption levels if ¯nancial institutions
are missing. When corrupt o±cials ¯nance the entry fee on the informal credit market, they
give their relatives a stake in corruption. Consequently, these groups of voters do not support
anti-corruption campaigns.
22Our analysis has demonstrated that institutions matter in the ¯ght against corruption. The
political preferences of agents depend on their economic opportunities that, in turn, depend
on the institutional environment. In the absence of ¯nancial institutions that provide produc-
tive investment opportunities, citizens may rationally invest in (unproductive) activities linked
to corruption by ¯nancing entry fees. Petty corruption and political decisions are linked be-
cause savers then oppose socially bene¯cial political measures that aim at abolishing these
unproductive activities. Financial institutions could thus contribute to the political success of
anti-corruption policies. If functioning ¯nancial institutions exist, investors do not depend on
corruption and the incentives of politicians to run on anti-corruption platforms increase.
For a country that strives to reduce corruption, one policy measure should be to establish
a functioning banking system. Moreover, banks should be given an incentive to ¯ght against
corruption by committing themselves not to ¯nance corrupt ventures. Our model has demon-
strated that if banks screen, ¯nancial institutions always reduce the equilibrium corruption level.
However, even if banks do not screen, the presence of a functioning banking sector provides the
relatives with an additional option to invest and neutralizes their positive stake in corruption. In
some cases, the corruption level is lowered even more with pooling than with screening as screen-
ing by banks drives corrupt o±cials to the informal credit market, thus giving more citizens a
positive stake in corruption.
With this paper, we hope also to stimulate more empirical research on the practice of de-
manding entry fees for lucrative positions and on the ways these entry fees are ¯nanced. As we
have shown, these practices can weaken the political preferences for anti-corruption measures.
Therefore, a more profound knowledge about these mechanisms would be important.
236 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 2
The Nash bargaining solution obtains when bS maximizes the surplus that can be split among
the two parties:
bS = argmax[(UIS
K (c) ¡ US
K(c))(UIS
R (c) ¡ US
R(c))]
Both relatives and corrupt o±cials have the outside option to become depositors. Therefore,
the Nash bargaining solution has to ful¯ll UIS
K (c) = UIS
R (c) or:
[(n ¡ 1) + ®ENR°]¾c ¡ (1 + bS)(tc ¡ A) ¡ u(c) = A + bS(tc ¡ A) + r(2A ¡ tc) ¡ u(c)
Solving for bS, this condition yields bS =
[(n¡1)]¾c¡tc(1¡r)¡2rA
2(tc¡A) .
6.2 Proof of Proposition 3
The Nash bargaining solution obtains when bP maximizes the surplus that can be split among
the two parties:
bP = argmax[(UIP
K (c) ¡ UP
K(c))(UIP
R (c) ¡ UP
R(c))]
Explicitly writing out the utility levels and simplifying yields:
¡(1 + bP)(tc ¡ A) + (1 + r)tc = A + bP(tc ¡ A) + r(2A ¡ tc) , bP = r
Therefore, we derive UIP
K (c) = UP
K(c) and UIP
R (c) = UP
R(c).
6.3 Proof of Lemma 1
To obtain the equilibrium corruption level for the situation without ¯nancial institutions, we
use the utility functions de¯ned in section 3.2 and insert them into the ¯rst order condition for
the equilibrium corruption level.
@v
@c
=
X
J
®JSJ
µ
¡
@u(c)
@c
¶
+ (®RSR + ®KSK)
¾(n ¡ 1) ¡ t
2
= 0
Rearranging yields the above condition.
6.4 Proof of Lemma 2
To obtain the equilibrium corruption level for the situation with ¯nancial institutions and screen-
ing, we use the utility functions de¯ned in section 3.3 for the case with screening and plug them
24into the ¯rst order condition for the equilibrium corruption level:
@v
@c
= 0 ,
X
J
®JSJ
µ
¡
@u(c)
@c
¶
+ (®KSK + ®RSR)
¾ (n ¡ 1) ¡ (1 + r)t
2
= 0
Rearranging yields the result.
6.5 Proof of Lemma 3
To obtain the equilibrium corruption level for the situation with ¯nancial institutions and pool-
ing, we use the utility functions de¯ned in section 3.3 for the case where no screening is possible
and plug them into the ¯rst order condition for the equilibrium corruption level:
@v
@c
= 0 ,
X
J
®JSJ
µ
¡
@u(c)
@c
¶
+ ®KSK[¾ (n ¡ 1) ¡ (1 + r)t] = 0
Rearranging yields the result.
6.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Comparing the ¯rst order conditions for the equilibrium corruption levels in the case without a
bank, as derived in lemma 1, and with banks o®ering screening contracts, as derived in lemma
2, yields:
@u(c¤
N)
@c
¡
@u(c¤
S)
@c
=
(®KSK + ®RSR)
¾(n¡1)¡t
2 P
J ®JSJ
¡
(®KSK + ®RSR)
¾(n¡1)¡(1+r)t
2 P
J ®JSJ
This di®erence is positive if and only if
¡rt(SK+SR)
2 < 0, using our assumption that ®K = ®R.
This is always true. As
@u(c)
@c > 0 and
@2u(c)
(@c) > 0, this means that then, c¤
N > c¤
S.
6.7 Proof of Proposition 6
Comparing the ¯rst order conditions for the equilibrium corruption levels in the case without a
bank, as derived in lemma 1, and with banks o®ering pooling contracts, as derived in lemma 3,
yields:
@u(c¤
N)
@c
¡
@u(c¤
P)
@c
=
(®KSK + ®RSR)
¾(n¡1)¡t
2 P
J ®JSJ
¡
®KSK [¾ (n ¡ 1) ¡ (1 + r)t]
P
J ®JSJ
This di®erence is positive if and only if SK
³
¾(n¡1)¡t
2 ¡ rt
´
< SR
¾(n¡1)¡t
2 , using our assumption
that ®K = ®R.
As
@u(c)
@c > 0 and
@2u(c)
(@c) > 0, this means that then, c¤
N > c¤
P:
256.8 Proof of Proposition 7
Comparing the ¯rst order conditions for the equilibrium corruption levels in the case with banks
o®ering pooling contracts, as derived in lemma 3 and in the case with banks o®ering screening
contracts, as derived in lemma 2, yields:
@u(c¤
P)
@c
¡
@u(c¤
S)
@c
=
®KSK [¾ (n ¡ 1) ¡ (1 + r)t]
P
J ®JSJ
¡
(®KSK + ®RSR)[
¾(n¡1)¡(1+r)t
2 ]
P
J ®JSJ
This di®erence is negative if and only if 2®KSK < ®RSR + ®KSK, i.e., SK < SR, using our
assumption that ®K = ®R.
As
@u(c)
@c > 0 and
@2u(c)
(@c) > 0, this means that then, c¤
S > c¤
P:
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